The Performance of Listed Hedge Fund Firms by SUN, Lin & TEO, Melvyn
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection BNP Paribas Hedge Fund
Centre BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre
7-2013
The Performance of Listed Hedge Fund Firms
Lin SUN
Singapore Management University
Melvyn TEO
Singapore Management University, melvynteo@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/bnp_research
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This Magazine Article is brought to you for free and open access by the BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre by an authorized administrator of
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
Sun, Lin and Melvyn Teo. 2013 July. The Performance of Listed Hedge Fund Firms. Hedge Fund Insights, 2-7.
Hedge Fund Insights, July 2013 
 
 
BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre at SMU 
1 
 
BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre 
Hedge Fund Insights  
 
Contents 
 
• Mission of the BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre 
• The Performance of Listed Hedge Fund Firms by Sun Lin and Melvyn Teo 
• Update on the Centre’s Activities 
 
Mission of the BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre 
 
The mission of the BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre is to facilitate, encourage, and sponsor high-level 
academic research on hedge funds. The Centre also provides outstanding education to students, executives, 
and investors, and publishes objective and independent information on hedge funds, while promoting 
understanding and awareness of alternative investment strategies. Through excellence in research on 
alternative investments, the Centre is recognized for its capacity to foster stimulating exchange of opinions, 
and to develop a knowledgeable and objective information base regarding hedge funds.     
 
Specifically, the primary objectives of the BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre at the Singapore Management 
University are to  
 
1. conduct and disseminate high quality academic hedge fund research 
2. educate finance practitioners and the investor public on hedge funds, and  
3. raise the profile of the hedge fund industry in Asia and Singapore 
 
To achieve these goals, the Centre will collaborate closely with academics at the London Business School. 
Moreover at all times, the Centre is absolutely committed to the highest ethical conduct and will actively avoid 
any conflicts of interest with outside parties.   
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The Performance of Listed Hedge Fund Firms 
 
Sun Lin and Melvyn Teo1 
 
Executive summary 
 
We examine the impact of fund management company listing on hedge fund performance. We find that hedge 
funds managed by listed firms underperform those managed by unlisted firms by 1.89 per annum after 
adjusting for risk. Using an event study framework, we show that hedge fund performance deteriorates from 
10.32 percent per year in the 36-month pre-listing window to 2.16 percent per year in the 36-month post-listing 
window. Over the same period, firm assets under management effectively double from US$1.54bn to 
US$3.04bn. There is no evidence to suggest that funds managed by listed firms are better able to manage 
operational risk and are therefore less likely to terminate fund operations. Our results shed light on the motives 
for exchange listing by hedge fund firms.  
 
 
 
“When a fund management company lists on a stock exchange, its clients are not uniformly delighted. They 
are aware that potential conflicts of interests can arise that some companies fail to manage. However, there 
are also benefits for clients …”       
- The Financial Times, 22 July 2012 
 
Why do hedge fund management companies list on stock exchanges? Fund investors charge that firm listing 
allows firm founders to sell off their stakes in the fund management company to outsiders which introduces 
potential conflicts of interests. Given that few listed firms are able to escape the pressures from earnings 
season, fund managers in a listed firm may focus exclusively on returns quarter on quarter and sacifice long-
term investment performance. Firm founders contend that listing allows hedge fund firms to better incentivize 
employees through employee stock options. The funds raised through the initial public offering allow firms to 
invest in technology and business support. Investors acknowledge that listed firms may be operationally more 
robust than their unlisted counterparts as the former tend to provide greater transparency and disclosure.2 In 
this issue of the hedge fund insights, we put these concerns to the test and evaluate the performance of hedge 
funds run by listed management companies.  
 
Our analysis centers on data obtained from the TASS, HFR and BarclayHedge databases and on the 1994-
2011 period. We merge these databases by hand using fund name. The sample includes 18,338 funds of 
which 11,624 stop reporting by the end of the sample period in December 2011, leaving us with 6,714 live 
                                                
1 Sun Lin is Ph.D. candidate in the Ph.D. in Business (Finance) program at the Singapore Management University and 
Melvyn Teo is Professor of Finance and Director, BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre at the Singapore Management 
University. Address all correspondence to Melvyn Teo. E-mail: melvynteo@smu.edu.sg. Phone: +65-6828-0735. We 
thank Narayan Naik for helpful suggestions and comments. Kelvin Min provided research assistance. 
2 See “Going Public Brings Benefits and Pitfalls,” The Financial Times, 22 July 2012. 
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funds at the end of the sample period. Of the funds in our combined sample, 3,402 funds are unique to TASS, 
1,889 funds are unique to HFR, and 5,345 funds are unique to BarclayHedge. 
 
To determine whether a hedge fund management company is listed on a stock exchange, we obtain a list of 
listed asset management companies that manage hedge funds from three sources: (i) The Opalesque report 
on listed hedge funds which provides names of all listed asset management firms up to September 2007 
(Gravrand, 2007), (ii) a list of publicly listed asset management companies from Yahoo! Finance 
(http://biz.yahoo.com/ic/422_cl_pub.html), and (iii) a Google search on various keywords as well as a Factiva 
search on news articles from the Wall Street Journal, The Financial Times, and Reuters. We then match the 
hedge fund management companies with the firms in our database and verify the link between the listed firm 
and the hedge fund management company using the S&P Capital IQ database. The S&P Capital IQ database 
also allows us to determine hedge fund firm listing date in the case of mergers and acquisitions.  
 
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the number of listed firms as well as the number of funds and the size 
of the assets that they manage. While the number of listed fund management companies is small relative to 
the number of unlisted fund management companies, listed fund management companies manage a growing 
number of funds and pool of assets. In 1994, there were only eight listed firms managing 14 funds and 
US$2.43bn of assets. In 2011, the number of listed firms has grown to 99. These firms manage 907 funds and 
US$232.95bn of assets. This represents a 64-fold and 96-fold increase in the number of funds and asset under 
management, respectively. At end of our sample period, listed firms manage 14.59 percent of industry assets, 
a significant increase from 4.09 percent of industry assets at the start of the sample period.  
 
Table 1: Fund sample summary statistics 
 
 
To understand the impact of firm listing on fund performance, we first perform a simple fund sort. Every year on 
January 1, we sort funds into two groups based on whether they were managed by listed firms or by non-listed 
firms. We hold the funds for a year and rebalance every January 1. The post formation returns on these fund 
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portfolios are then linked across years to form a single return series for each portfolio. We then evaluate the 
performance of the listed and non-listed firm portfolios relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factor model. The 
Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors include the S&P 500 factor (SNPMRF), the size factor (SCMLC), the term 
spread (BD10RET), the default spread (BAAMTSY), and trend following factors for bonds (PTFSBD), foreign 
exchange (PTFSFX), and commodities (PTFSCOM). The results in Table 2 indicate that funds managed by 
listed firms underperform those managed by unlisted firms by 1.76 percent before adjusting for risk and by 1.89 
percent after adjusting for risk.  
 
Table 2: Sorts on firm listing 
 
 
In Figure 1, we plot the cumulative excess return of funds managed by listed firms versus funds managed by 
unlisted firms. We find that hedge funds run by listed management companies only started underperforming 
those run by unlisted management companies after 2000, which coincided with the height of the equity bull 
market in the 1990s. One view is that hedge fund firms monetize their past performance and time the stock 
market by listing opportunistically when equity valuations are high. These firms subsequently underperform 
post listing.    
 
Figure 1: Performance of funds managed by listed firms versus funds managed by non-listed firms 
 
Small hedge funds such as those with assets under management below US$20m are typically less interesting 
to institutional investors who write large cheques. In addition, there are concerns that some of the results may 
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be driven by the underperformance of very small funds managed by listed firms or the overperformance of very 
small funds run by unlisted firms. To address these issues, we redo the fund portfolio sort after dropping funds 
with less than US$20m in assets under management. We find that funds controlled by listed firms 
underperform funds controlled by unlisted firms by 2.27 percent per year before adjusting for risk and by 2.34 
percent per year after adjusting for risk. Indeed, the listed versus non-listed spread has increased after 
dropping very small hedge funds from the analysis. Given fund capacity constraints and the finding that smaller 
funds generally tend to outperform larger funds, this suggests that there is a greater preponderance of very 
small funds amongst those managed by unlisted firms than amongst those managed by listed firms.    
 
Table 3: Sorts on firm listing for funds with at least US$20m in assets under management 
 
 
Other than fund assets under management, factors that may explain hedge fund performance include fund 
fees, redemption terms, minimum investment, and age. Funds that charge higher incentive fees may be better 
incentivized to deliver performance (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009). Funds that set longer redemption 
periods can partake in more illiquid securities and therefore earn a liquidity premium (Aragon, 2007). Funds 
that set higher minimum investment amounts may be in a better bargaining position vis-à-vis investors 
because of the superior pedigree of their fund managers. Younger funds that need to build a superior track 
record so as to raise capital and reach critical mass tend to be more motivated to generate stellar returns 
(Aggarwal and Jorion, 2011).  
 
Table 4: Regressions on hedge fund performance 
 
 
To distinguish the impact of such factors from the listing effect, we estimate OLS and Fama and MacBeth 
regressions on fund returns in excess of the risk free rate and on fund alpha. The regressions include as 
independent variables a listed firm dummy, management fee, performance fee, minimum investment, the 
natural logarithm of fund size, and fund age. The results reported in Table 4 reveal that the listed firm effect 
Hedge Fund Insights, July 2013 
 
 
BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre at SMU 
6 
cannot be explained by any of the other factors known to explain fund performance. The coefficient estimates 
from the OLS regressions indicate that, after controlling other variables, firm listing crimps fund excess returns 
and alpha by 1.56 percent per year and 1.68 percent per year, respectively. Both these results are statistically 
significant at the one percent level. We obtain similar inferences from the Fama and MacBeth regressions.   
 
To further understand the impact of firm listing on fund performance, we adopt an event study framework and 
analyze fund returns and assets under management in the 36-month pre and post IPO period. Figure 2 plots 
the average fund monthly returns and assets under management in the 36-month period before and in the 36-
month period after firm IPO. We find that in line with the results from the portfolio sorts (Tables 2 and 3), fund 
performance deteriorates from 10.32 percent per year in the pre-event window to 2.16 percent per year in the 
post event window. At the same time, fund assets under management increases by 64 percent from 
US$39.91m in the 36-month pre-listing period to US$65.48m in the 36-month post-listing period. Listed firms 
staged an even larger increase in assets under management, growing by 98 percent from US$1.54bn in the 
pre-listing window to US$3.04bn in the post-listing window. Together with the findings from Tables 2 and 3, 
these results suggest that firms that listed likely outperformed other firms pre-IPO but underperformed other 
firms post-IPO. These findings cast doubt on the view that firm listing is helpful for fund investors.  
 
Figure 2: Fund performance and assets under management pre- and post-firm listing 
 
 
Perhaps listed hedge fund firms are able to compensate for their poorer investment performance by better 
minimizing operational risk and therefore reducing the probability that funds managed by such firms will 
terminate operations. Indeed there are reasons to believe that listed firms will be better at managing 
operational risk. Listed companies typically have to adhere to strict corporate governance standards. Better 
corporate governance may translate to superior risk management and lower operational risk. To investigate, 
we estimate logit regressions on the probability that a fund will terminate operations each year. The 
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regressions include as independent variables those used in the Table 4 regressions as well as an additional 
variable to capture fund past performance: past three-year fund return. To determine whether a fund has 
terminated operations, we consider two cases. In case 1, all funds that dropped out of the database are 
assumed to have terminated operations. In case 2, only funds that dropped out of the database following three 
consecutive months of negative fund returns are assumed to have terminated operations. The coefficient 
estimates from the multivariate logit regressions indicate that the probability that a fund terminates operations 
is either positively associated with the listing dummy. In case 1, the coefficient estimate on the dummy is 
statistically significant at the one percent level while in case 2, the estimate is statistically indistinguishable 
from zero. These results suggest that firm listing does not on average engender higher fund survival 
probabilities.3    
 
Conclusion 
 
Reading between the lines, our findings suggest that hedge fund firms with strong performance records list on 
stock exchanges. These firms subsequently experience a dramatic reduction in performance post-listing, so 
much so that they begin to underperform, albeit modestly, their unlisted competitors. These results are less in 
keeping with the view that listing on a stock exchange allows hedge fund firms to better incentivize employees 
via the award of stocks and stock options, and are more in line with the notion that firm founders take 
advantage of a recent bout of stellar performance by opportunistically offloading their ownership stakes in the 
fund management company to stock investors. That said, investors in the listed fund management companies 
benefit from the close to 100 percent increase in firm assets under management post listing which translates to 
higher management fees and therefore greater firm revenue. Fund investors however have to contend with 
poorer fund performance post listing and little or no improvements in fund operational risk management.  
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3 We also redo the Table 2 and 3 sorts after including a -10% return for the month that a fund drops out of a database to 
account for fund termination. Our findings easily survive the adjustment for fund termination.  
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Update on the Centre’s Activities 
 
Education 
 
Our annual hedge fund conference will be held in the morning of 18 October 2013. The confirmed speakers for 
the event include Chris Gradel from Pacific Alliance Group, Owi Ruivivar from Goldman Sachs, Wong Kok Hoi 
from APS Asset Management, and Professor Tarun Ramadorai from Oxford. Conference registration is by 
invitation only. Please stay tuned for the conference emailer.  
 
Research 
 
The centre director will be presenting his work on “Growing the Asset Management Franchise: Evidence from 
Hedge Fund Firms” (with Bill Fung, David Hsieh, and Narayan Naik) at the European Finance Association 
Meetings in Cambridge UK on 29 August 2013.   
  
 
For more information regarding the BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre at SMU and our upcoming activities, 
please contact Ms Karyn Tai, centre coordinator (Tel: +65-6828-0933, E-mail: hfc@smu.edu.sg) or visit our 
webpage at http://www.smu.edu.sg/centres/hfc/index.asp. We look forward to receiving your suggestions and 
comments.  
